

Message Text

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ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00
NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-04 H-01 INR-07
L-03 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 MC-02
ACDA-07 EB-08 AID-05 IO-13 TRSE-00 IGA-02 /099 W
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O 231058Z APR 77

FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3869

AMEMBASSY DAKAR

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 NDJAMENA 1359

E O 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, EAID, CD

SUBJ: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MALLOUM

1. SUMMARY: AT HIS INVITATION, HAD AN HOUR AND ONE HALF CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT MALLOUM EVENING OF APRIL 22. ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER GALMAI AND DCM ALSO ATTENDED. PRESIDENT HAD RETURNED FROM DAKAR THREE HOURS EARLIER AND WAS CLEARLY CONCERNED OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN AFRICA AND PARTICULARLY AMERICA'S ROLE IN AFRICA. HE WAS COMPLETELY FRANK, LOQUACIOUS, AND CRITICAL, BUT WITHOUT BITTERNESS OR RANCOR. HE SAID MY TRIP TO WASHINGTON WAS COINCIDING WITH A TURNING POINT IN US RELATIONS WITH AFRICA IN GENERAL AND CHAD IN PARTICULAR. PRESIDENT CRITICIZED OUR FAILURE TO ASSIST OUR ALLY IN ZAIRE; EXPRESSED HIS CONTINUED DISILLUSIONMENT WITH OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN CHAD; REPEATED REQUEST FOR ARMS; INCLUDED QUOTE AMERICAN QUOTE OIL COMPANY AS PART OF HIS PRO-WESTERN COOPERATION; AND CHARACTERIZED DAKAR CONFERENCE AS A GROUP OF WORRIED PRO-WESTERN MEN WHO FELT THEY WERE IN THE PROCESS OF BEING DESERTED.

2. PRESIDENT MALLOUM POINTED OUT THAT OUR FAILURE TO ASSIST
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OUR QUOTE FRIEND QUOTE MOBUTU WAS A TERRIBLE OMEN FOR ALL AFRICAN COUNTRIES THAT FELT PRO-WESTERN. WHEN I POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD HOPED TO ACHIEVE AN AFRICAN SETTLEMENT OF AN AFRICAN PROBLEM, HE DISAGREED. HE SAID EVERYONE IN AFRICA EQUATED MOBUTU WITH THE US AND IT SEEMED CLEAR WE WERE NOW CONTENT TO STAND ASIDE AND SEE OUR ALLY FALL. HE CONCLUDED THAT IF WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO DO ANYTHING IN AFRICA, WE SHOULD QUIT

TALKING SO MUCH ABOUT IT.

3. HE SAID OUR WEAKNESS WAS RESULTING IN MORE AND MORE AFRICAN COUNTRIES, INCLUDING CHAD, TURNING TO THE RUSSIANS FOR ASSISTANCE. HE STRESSED THAT THIS WAS IN NO SENSE AN IDEOLOGICAL DECISION. HE SAID THAT AFRICANS IN GENERAL AND CHADIANS IN PARTICULAR WERE TOO INDIVIDUALISTIC AND SELF-INTERESTED TO BE EVEN GOOD SOCIALISTS, MUCH LESS COMMUNISTS. HOWEVER, HE ADMITTED THAT A STRONG DICTATORIAL GOVERNMENT COULD OVERCOME SUCH PROBLEMS.

4. FOR FIRST TIME IN ANY OF MY CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT, HE REFERRED POINTEDLY TO THE QUOTE AMERICAN QUOTE OIL INTERESTS IN CHAD. HE COINED THIS IN TERMS OF HIS PRESENT PRO-WESTERN ORIENTATION WHICH WAS BEING THREATENED BY DEVELOPMENTS IN AFRICA. ALSO FOR FIRST TIME HE EXPRESSED SOME LACK OF FAITH IN CONOCO. WHEN WE PURSUED THE SUBJECT, DESPITE MY AVOWELS THAT US GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS WERE SEPARATE ENTITIES, IT BECAME CLEAR HIS DISILLUSIONMENT WAS BASED ON THREE SEPARATE SOURCES: A) HIS CONFUSION OVER UNEXPLAINED ABSENCE OF CONOCO PRES-

IDENT FROM CHAD; B) SLOWNESS IN PROGRESS OF THE MINI-REFINERY WHICH THE COMPANY HAD PROMISED HIM; AND C) PRESSURE FROM VARIOUS CHADIAN ELEMENTS WHO FEEL CONOCO IS NOT GOING AS FAST AS IT COULD IN OPENING THE PETROLEUM QUOTE TREASURES QUOTE OF CHAD. I WAS ABLE TO EXPLAIN CONOCO PRESIDENT'S ABSENCE AS A MEDICAL EVACUATION, AND THE PRESIDENT SEEMED GENUINELY RELIEVED. IN GENERAL, I BELIEVE WE DEFUSED THE SITUATION FOR CONFIDENTIAL

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THE MOMENT, BUT IT REMAINS A POTENTIAL DANGER.

5. SPEAKING CANDIDLY, HE SAID THAT MY PREDECESSOR, MY DCM, MYSELF, OUR RESIDENT AID STAFF, AND SCORES OF VISITORS HAD BEEN PROMISING CHAD AID FOR YEARS, BUT THAT NOTHING SIGNIFICANT HAD AS YET REALLY APPEARED. WHILE IN WASHINGTON HE WANTED ME TO ASCERTAIN JUST WHAT WE WERE PREPARED TO DO TO REALLY BE OF ASSISTANCE TO CHAD. HE MADE HIS DISILLUSIONMENT WITH OUR PROGRAM FOR CHAD, PARTICULARLY PROJECTS LIKE THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURAL INSTITUTIONS, COMPLETELY CLEAR. HE SAID CHAD HAS MANY PROBLEMS WITH WHICH THEY WOULD NEED ASSISTANCE, BUT THEY COULD NOT ALL BE SOLVED AT ONCE. HE STATED HE WAS WILLING TO LIVE WITH POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF GOING SLOW IN SOME FIELDS WHILE STRESSING THOSE ECONOMIC AREAS THAT WOULD INCREASE CHAD'S FOOD PRODUCTION AND/OR REVENUES. I TOLD HIM THAT THIS WAS PRECISELY THE TYPE OF PROBLEM I WOULD BE DISCUSSING IN WASHINGTON. WE REPEATED THE ENTIRE PORTION OF THE CONVERSATION TO BE SURE WE WERE CLEAR AS TO WHAT HE WANTED IN THIS CONNECTION. HE REPEATED HIS POINTS FORCEFULLY AND SAID HE HOPED I

WOULD TELL PRESIDENT CARTER OF HIS DESIRE TO REMAIN TRULY NON-ALIGNED, BUT MEANINGFUL ASSISTANCE FROM U.S. WAS NECESSARY TO BALANCE SOVIET RESPONSIVENESS IN OTHER FIELDS. HE EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO HAVE ME WORK WITH HIM PERSONALLY ON AID MATTERS. WHEN I POINTED OUT THIS WOULD BE A GREAT IMPOSITION ON HIS TIME, HE SAID THAT IT WAS SO IMPORTANT THAT WE WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER HE WOULD MAKE ANY AMOUNT OF TIME AVAILABLE.

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O 231058Z APR 77

FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3870

AMEMBASSY DAKAR

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 NDJAMENA 1359

6. HIS REFERENCE TO SOVIET ASSISTANCE LED US TO CHADIAN DESIRE FOR US MILITARY AID. PRESIDENT APPEARED DOUBTFUL OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO CONTAIN, WITHOUT ADDITIONAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE, INSURGENCY WHICH WAS BEING GIVEN MORE SUPPORT BY LIBYA. HE RESTATED HIS EARLIER ARGUMENTS ON THE NEED OF CHAD FOR SUCH ASSISTANCE AND, ALLUDING TO OUR POLICY OF DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT VERSUS OFFENSIVE EQUIPMENT, SAID HE WAS PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT. HIS DEFINITION OF THE TWO TYPES OF EQUIPMENT WAS CLEARLY BASED ON THE USE TO WHICH IT WAS PUT AND NOT THE NATURE OF THE EQUIPMENT ITSELF. HE STRESSED A STRONG DESIRE FOR TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT WHILE MENTIONING OTHER SUCH ITEMS AS TANKS AND ARTILLERY. I RESPONDED DIRECTLY THAT I DID NOT WANT TO RAISE ANY FALSE HOPES OR DECEIVE HIM, AND THAT WHILE I WOULD TRANSMIT ANY MESSAGE TO WASHINGTON HE DESIRED TO SEND, I COULD HOLD OUT NO HOPE FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

7. HE CHARACTERIZED THE DAKAR CONFERENCE AS A GROUP OF WORRIED MEN WHO FELT PRO-WESTERN BUT FEARED THEY WERE IN THE PROCESS OF BEING DESERTED. HE SAID FRENCH PRESIDENT SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND

THE PROBLEM AND HAD STRESSED NECESSITY FOR SECURITY IN ORDER
TO ACHIEVE DEVELOPMENT, BUT PRESIDENT MALLOUM INDICATED DOUBT
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THAT FRENCH WOULD BE ABLE TO PERFORM ALL THEY HAD PROMISED.

8. COMMENTS: PRESIDENT WAS CLEARLY WORRIED BOTH BY WHAT HE
HEARD IN DAKAR AND BY INTERNAL SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS.
HIS RESPONSE TO THIS CONCERN IS A PREDICTABLY MILITARY RESPONSE
OF A DESIRE FOR MORE ARMS. HE IS GOING TO FIND A NEGATIVE
RESPONSE DIFFICULT TO SWALLOW, BUT I BELIEVE THAT IF WE ARE
PREPARED TO ENTER INTO AN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM THAT IS MEANING-
FUL AND SIGNIFICANT TO HIM, WE CAN FINESSE THE PROBLEM. HIS
REFERENCE TO CONOCO AS AN AMERICAN INTEREST IS WORRISOME AND
I BELIEVE THE COMPANY MUST MOVE RAPIDLY ON THE MINI-REFINERY
TO REINFORCE ITS POSITION HERE.BRADFORD

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